

as long as confused opponents lead the world astray. Wisdom born of reflection (*cintāmayī prajñā*) operates with conventional valid cognitions, and hence they are indirectly a cause for the realization of the ultimate *pramāṇa*.

Thus it is clear that in the intention of the promoters of *pramāṇa* studies this system apparently had a strong connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e., as the teaching of a path towards salvation, and that they never considered themselves to be involved in non-Buddhistic activities.

First logic, then the Buddha?

The controversy about the chapter sequence of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* and the soteriological relevance of inference

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Specifying the main theme of the symposium that occasioned this collection of papers, Gregor Paul asked whether, and to what extent, Buddhist texts state or imply that argumentation cannot lead to insights relevant for spiritual liberation, but at best serves to prepare for such insights, which are to be gained through other means.

Within Indian Buddhism, there flourished from the 6th century onwards a tradition that modern research has dubbed logico-epistemological, represented most famously by Dignāga (ca. 480–540 C.E.) and Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660 C.E.). If one is to look for answers to Gregor Paul's questions, or for discussions which can be related to them, one most naturally turns to the works of this tradition, for the simple reason that it has produced an elaborate theory of knowledge, including a theory of argumentation, whose practical and theoretical relevance for liberation is addressed in numerous contexts.

In what follows, I shall reexamine materials pertaining to one particular controversy on this background: the controversy about the proper chapter sequence of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) which is already quite well-known among researchers in this field.¹ Passages in two works in particular are of interest in this connection: the *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* by Śākyabuddhi (ca. 660–720 C.E.), and the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā* by Jayanta (ca. middle of 11th c. C.E.?), the latter being a subcommentary on Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* that was most likely composed during the 8th century. Karṇakagomin's *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā*, a (probably) 8th century commentary on the chapter on inference for oneself of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, also contains some deliberations of interest in this context.

¹ Cf. especially Ono 1997, with further references to preceding discussions in research literature. I would like to thank Ono-san for generously providing me with text-files of some of the materials he used.

Reexamining these materials from a new perspective opens up a new dimension of what on the surface seems a rather dry discussion about the sequence of chapters in a revered text. Moreover, considering the philological difficulty of Jayanta's text, this paper provides a new translation and interpretation hypothesis of key passages, and thus also intends to contribute to more intricate and specialised discussions within research on Buddhist logic and epistemology.

1 The bone of contention: the structural difference of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*

Within the tradition, the chapter sequence of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* becomes problematic because the work is traditionally believed to be a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga, yet in its original form exhibits a different arrangement of chapters; that this was indeed (most probably) the original sequence can be determined primarily on text-internal evidence, that is, by considering the thematic structure of individual chapters, as well as cross-references between them.

Dignāga's text begins with the following salutation verse:

pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣiṇe praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine |
pramāṇasiddhīyai svamatāt samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viprasṛtād ihaikataḥ ||²
 "Saluting him who, as well as having come into existence, is a means of valid cognition,³ who seeks the benefit of the world, the teacher, the well-gone, the protector, I shall, for the purpose of establishing the means of valid cognition, compose the [Pramāṇa]samuccaya, uniting here under one head my views scattered [in many treatises]."

The first half of the verse praises the Buddha with altogether five attributes: he is a means of valid cognition and has come into existence (*pramāṇabhūta*), he seeks the benefit of the world (*jagaddhitaiṣin*), he is a teacher (*śāstr*), he is "well-gone" (*sugata*), and he is a protector (*tāyin*). The first chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* that begins right after this verse deals with

² The text, preserved in its entirety only in Tibetan translation, is here cited according to Sanskrit fragments that were identified in Hattori 1968.

³ Cf. Krasser 2001 for the various interpretations of *pramāṇabhūta* in commentaries and by modern scholars. Krasser suggests to translate the term, a Karmadhāraya compound, as "one who has come into existence being a *pramāṇa*" (p. 184). However, this might be misunderstood as emphasising e.g. that the Buddha already was a *pramāṇa* when coming into existence, and did not develop into one. In order to rule out this potential misunderstanding, I have chosen the slightly wordier translation "who, as well as having come into existence, is a means of valid cognition".

perception (*pratyakṣa*). It is followed by a chapter on inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) and one on inference for others (*parārthānumāna*), i.e. respectively on private inferential processes and on their verbalisation in contexts of instruction or disputation. The fourth chapter deals with examples and pseudo-examples in inferences, the fifth with theory of language and concept-formation, i.e. the so-called *apoha*-theory, and the sixth and last with futile rejoinders in a debate.

In its original form, Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* begins with a chapter on inference for oneself which, unlike the remaining chapters that are only written in verse, is accompanied with an auto-commentary in prose. The second chapter is called "establishment of means of valid cognition" (*pramāṇasiddhi*). This *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter contains a general definition of means of valid cognition in a few verses in the beginning, and then deals with the Buddha, his attributes, and core concepts of Buddhism. It is structured according to the attributes of the Buddha mentioned in Dignāga's salutation verse, and traditionally viewed as a commentary on it, or, to be precise, on its first half. The third chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* deals with perception, and the fourth with inference for others. For the last three chapters of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, there are no corresponding ones in the *Pramāṇavārttika*.

The difference in chapter sequence between these two texts has been deemed worthy of an explanation already in the oldest commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, composed by Devendrabuddhi (ca. 630–690 C.E.). His arguments in favour of an initial position of the chapter on inference for oneself are expanded in Śākyabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*. At some point in between Śākyabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta, the chapter sequence was reversed to harmonise with that of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*: the *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter was placed first, followed by the chapter on perception and the two chapters on inference for oneself and inference for others. Jayanta, author of a commentary on Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*, justifies this new sequence.

Both Śākyabuddhi and Jayanta deal with the chapter sequence in a spatial rather than a temporal sense, referring to the order of chapters as contained in the completed text, and not to the temporal sequence in which they were composed. This is worth emphasising because in some later Tibetan commentaries, these two aspects become separately discussed under the headings "sequence in which the treatise was composed" (*g'zūn rtsam pa'i go rim*) and "sequence in which [the chapters] are placed in the written text" (*glegs bam*

gnas pa'i go rim).⁴ Śākyabuddhi and Jayanta both tacitly assume that the initial position of a chapter in the *Pramāṇavārttika* is justified through the particular importance of its subject-matter.⁵ They not only consider different topics as the most important, but also appeal to different backgrounds for expounding and justifying the importance of what is to be treated first.

2 The key phrase in Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*

Since Śākyabuddhi's remarks comment on a key phrase in Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*, the oldest known commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, it is necessary to look at Devendrabuddhi's text first. This commentary only covers chapters two to four in the original sequence; as holds good for practically all other works dealt with in this paper, its Sanskrit original is lost, and it is as a whole available only in Tibetan translation. Some parts, however, may be tentatively reconstructed on the basis of other texts.

At the beginning of each chapter, the author offers brief remarks on its purpose and its connection with the preceding one.

1.) Beginning of commentary on chapter two, i.e. *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter

PVP D1b1f. = Q1b1–2a1: *slob dpon gyis tshad ma'i mtshan ñid kyī bstan bcos bśad pa'i rgyu rjes su dpag pa rnam par bžag nas skabs su bab pa tshad ma [pramāṇam] žes bya ba la sogs pas phyag 'tshal ba'i tshigs su bcad pa'i bśad pa mžad par rtsom pa'o |*

ācāryīyapramāṇalakṣaṇaśāstravyākhyānibandhanānumānaṃ vyavasthāpya prasutena pramāṇam ityādinā namaskāraśloka vyākhyānam ārambhate.

The tentative Sanskrit reconstruction is based on Sanskrit fragments for Śākyabuddhi's sub-commentary in PVKP 516,2ff. (Steinkellner 1981: 288f.); word-material in italics is attested in these fragments.

"Having established inference, which is a precondition for [his] explanation of the treatise defining [the individual] means of valid cognition [composed] by the teacher [Dignāga], [Dharmakīrti] begins the explanation of the salutation verse [of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*] with what he mentions [in the very beginning of chapter two], namely '*pramāṇam*' etc."

⁴ See e.g. mKhas grub's *rgyas pa'i bstan bcos tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi rgya cher bshad pa*, 24b5ff., where a view is presented that is attributed to Yamāri (*yam rin*, 24a3): *de lta na yan | rañ don rjes dpag gi le'u dañ por snañ ba ni | slob dpon gyis de ñid rtogs dka' bar gzigs nas | dañ por phyun ste 'grel pa mžad pas | de'i phyir glegs bam gnas pa'i go rim yin gyi | gzuñ rtsam pa'i go rim ma yin no |*

⁵ By contrast, in the account attributed to Yamāri by mKhas grub, the chapter on inference for oneself is placed in the beginning – and accompanied with an auto-commentary – because it is difficult to understand, and not because of its importance.

2.) Beginning of commentary on chapter three on perception

PVP D122a4ff. = Q142a3–5: *slob dpon gyis⁶ tshad ma'i mtshan ñid kyī bstan bcos bśad pa'i rgyu rjes su dpag pa snar rnam par gžag⁷ pa dañ | slob dpon gyis gsuñs pa bstan bcos kyī dañ por⁸ phyag 'tshal ba'i tshigs su bcad pa'i phyed 'og ma rtogs sla⁹ ba ñid kyī phyir phyed goñ ma ñid kyī¹⁰ bśad pa yoñs su rdzogs par mžad nas | da tshad ma'i mtshan ñid kyī bśad pa mžad pa'i phyir | gžal bya gñis phyir [meyadvaividhyāt] žes bya ba la sogs pa brtsams pa yin no |*

"Having earlier completed [his] establishment of inference, which is the precondition for [his] explanation of the treatise defining [the individual] means of valid cognition [composed] by the teacher [Dignāga], and having [then] completed his explanation of [only] the first half of the salutation verse [that is placed] in the beginning (*dañ por*) of the treatise composed by the teacher – for the second half is easy to understand –, [Dharmakīrti] now begins [chapter three with the expression] '*meyadvaividhyāt*', in order to explain the definition of [the individual] means of valid cognition."

3.) Beginning of commentary on chapter four on inference for others

PVP D268b6f. = Q319a8–b1: *... rañ gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa'i skabs su bab pa las | de snar bstan zin pa de ltar na mi 'chad do || go rims bzlog pa'i dgos pa ni snar bstan zin to |*

"... concerning inference for oneself as a subject matter, it is not explained [here] because it has already been explained before [in chapter one]. The purpose of reversing the [chapter] sequence has [also] been explained before [in my commentary on the beginning of chapter two]."

The key phrase to account for Dharmakīrti's reversal of the chapter sequence, i.e. the general difference in structure between *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and *Pramāṇavārttika*, is found in the commentary on the beginning of chapter two and taken up again in the beginning of chapter three:

"[Dharmakīrti], having established inference, which is a precondition for [his] explanation of the treatise defining [the individual] means of valid cognition [composed] by the teacher [Dignāga] ..."

The chapter on inference for oneself comes first because inference is a precondition for Dharmakīrti's subsequent explanation of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, which is in turn characterised as providing definitions of the two individual means of valid cognition perception and inference. However, we are not informed in what sense, and in virtue of which of its characteristic features, inference serves as a "precondition". In addition, these brief remarks make no specific claims about the relationship between the first two chapters: inference is a precondition for explanations which actually begin in chapter

⁶ *gyis* D: *gyi* Q

⁷ *gžag* D: *bžag* Q

⁸ *dañ por* Q: *dañ po* D

⁹ *sla ba* D: *bla ba* Q

¹⁰ *kyi* D: *kyis* Q

three, whereas chapter two explains the salutation verse.¹¹ A pedantic reader might conclude that inference is therefore *not* a precondition for the explanations Dharmakīrti provides in the second chapter, and it is perhaps out of consideration for such pedants that Śākyabuddhi addresses this question and clarifies the relationship between the first two chapters.

3 Śākyabuddhi's justification of the original chapter sequence

Śākyabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*, the second oldest preserved commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, covers all four chapters. While the commentary on the first chapter, on inference for oneself, is a direct commentary on Dharmakīrti's text, the commentary on the remaining chapters is a subcommentary on Devendrabuddhi's commentary.

The main discussion of the chapter sequence is given at the beginning of chapter two,¹² by way of commentary on Devendrabuddhi's key phrase. It is structured according to two questions: (1) Why did Dharmakīrti establish inference independently at the beginning of his work, given that he meant to explain the text of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*? (2) Why did he set aside the chapter sequence of Dignāga's text?¹³ The respective answers are formulated

¹¹ Devendrabuddhi's subsequent commentary at the beginning of chapter three clearly shows that he intended the expression *pramāṇa* in the term *pramāṇalakṣaṇasāstra* only to refer to perception and inference.

¹² Together with Sanskrit fragments from the *PVKP*, the entire text of this section is printed in Steinkellner 1981.

¹³ (1) *PVT* Ņe D 70b7ff. = Q 85b3ff.: *de la gal te slob dpon chos kyi grags pa 'di bstan bcos tshad ma kun las btus pa mnam par bśad par bzed pa yin pas de űid bśad par bya ba yin na | ci'i phyir dañ por rañ dbaṅ gis rjes su dpag pa'i mshan űid mnam par gźag pa mdzad ces bya ba ni brgal {ni brgal Q: nañ rgol D} ba'o | ...* "Here, the objection [to which Devendrabuddhi replies] is as follows: If said teacher Dharmakīrti intends to explain the treatise [called] *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, this very [treatise] is to be explained. Why, then, does he first establish the definition of inference independently (*rañ dbaṅ gis*)?" Cf. the Sanskrit fragment in *PVKP* 516,31–517,3: *iyam cātrāsāṅkā: yady ācāryadharmakīrtinā pramāṇasamuccayo vyākhyātum prastutaḥ, tadā sa eva vyākhyāyatām. kimity ādāv utkramyānumānalakṣaṇam vyākhyātavān iti.* Cf. also the parallel in *PVSVT* 4,28f: *yadi pramāṇasamuccayavyākhyāṃ cikīrśur ācāryadharmakīrtiḥ kasmāt svātān-tryeṇānumānam vyavasthāpayatīty āsaṅkāṃ apanayann āha ...*

(2) *PVT* Ņe D 71a7f. = Q 86a4f.: *tshad ma mnam 'grel gyi le'u dañ por tshad ma kun las btus pa'i rañ gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa'i le'u rtsod nan lan btap pa'i sgo nas don gyis {gyis D: gyi Q} mnam par bśad nas | de la ci'i phyir rim pa las brgal nas mdzad ces bya ba'i rtsod pa ...* The [second] objection [to which Devendrabuddhi replies] is as follows: Given that [Dharmakīrti] indirectly, by replying to inferior objections, explained the chapter on inference for oneself of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* in the first chapter of the

in connection with two semantically and syntactically different analyses of Devendrabuddhi's compound *ācāryāyapramāṇalakṣaṇasāstravyākhyānibandhanānumānam*.

To answer the first question, Śākyabuddhi additionally relies on his understanding of Dharmakīrti's motivation for the composition of the inference chapter as such. Dharmakīrti had presented this motivation in the statement of purpose at the beginning of the first chapter of the auto-commentary, where he refers to himself in the third person:

PVSV 1,8f.: *arthānarthavivecanasyānumānāśrayatvāt tadvipratipattes tadvyavasthāpanāya āha ...*

"Because discerning what is beneficial and what is harmful is based on inference, he says, in order to establish this [inference] because there are false opinions about it"

For Śākyabuddhi, "beneficial" refers to Dignāga's definitions of the individual means of valid cognition as given in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* because these are correct (*yuktatvāt*). "Harmful", on the other hand, refers to the incorrect definitions given by non-Buddhists. Discerning (*vivecana*) correct and incorrect definitions is based on inference because perception, the only other recognised means of valid cognition, cannot fulfil this task. Inference operates with concepts (*vikalpa*), or is investigating (*vicāraka*), whereas perception is by definition non-conceptual and not investigating. Dharmakīrti therefore composed the inference chapter because inference is needed for discerning correct definitions from incorrect ones within his explanation of the content of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Furthermore, because there are false opinions about inference itself – as Dharmakīrti himself says with the phrase "because there are false opinions about it" (*tadvipratipatteḥ*) in the statement of purpose – these are to be rectified first.¹⁴

Pramāṇavārttika, why did he give this [explanation] overriding the [chapter] sequence [of Dignāga's text]?"

For the phrase *ādāv utkramya* ("setting aside the beginning [of Dignāga's work]") in the *PVKP* fragment for question (1), the Tibetan translation of *PVT* has *rañ dbaṅ gis*, corresponding to *svātāntryeṇa* in the *PVSVT* parallel. An equivalent for *ādāv utkramya* from *PVKP* occurs in the Tibetan text for question (2), namely *rim pa las brgal nas*, "overriding the [chapter] sequence [of Dignāga's work]". This indicates that the author of *PVKP* has conflated the two questions into one.

¹⁴ Cf. the Sanskrit fragment for *PVT* Ņe D5b7ff. = Q5b3ff. on the statement of purpose in chapter one in *PVSVT* 6,2–5: *ācāryadignāgapraṇītam pramāṇalakṣaṇādīkam artho yuktatvāt, űrthikapraṇītam na yuktatvād anarthaḥ. taylor vivecanam yuktāyuktatvena vyavasthāpanam, tasyānumānāśrayatvāt. anumānam eva hy āśrītya lakṣaṇavākyaṇām yuktāyuktatvam vyavasthāpyam, na pratyakṣam, tasyāvicāratvād iti.* The Tibetan text continues with the explanation of Dharmakīrti's *tadvipratipatteḥ*: *'di skad du gañ gi phyir rjes su dpag pa la brien nas | tshad ma kun las bstus pa'i don bśad par bya ba yin*

By presenting inference as the basis for evaluating competing definitions of means of valid cognition, Śākyabuddhi places the *Pramānavārttika* in a dialectical framework that speaks of the general social background which, in spite of the absence of detailed historical records, we can assume to have been formative for the logico-epistemological tradition at large: a competitive environment in which highly educated representatives of rivaling religious-philosophical traditions engaged in argument with each other, in texts as well as in public debates. Such debates served as a social ritual that earned the winner fame and merit, as well as support on behalf of worldly rulers. As the main theoretical foundation of inter-traditional argument, inference has thus an “outward” function that connects learned Buddhist monks with other traditions, in writing or in personal confrontation.

Śākyabuddhi’s special consideration of this outward function of inference is further borne out by his interpretation of two terms used in Devendrabuddhi’s key phrase. The term *śāstra*, “treatise”, in Devendrabuddhi’s compound *ācāryāyapramāṇalakṣaṇāśāstravyākhyānibandhanānumānam* is explained through an appropriation of an honourable Buddhist quasi-etymology: the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is a *śāstra* in that it conquers adversaries and offers protection, two functions which are respectively connected with the Sanskrit roots *śās-* and *trā-* that are thus declared to constitute the term *śāstra*.¹⁵ In Vasubandhu’s *Vyākhyāyukti*, the earliest known Buddhist text that invokes this quasi-etymology, a *śāstra* conquers moral afflictions as adversaries (*kleśaripūn*) and protects from rebirth in lower existences (*durgatito bhavāt*).¹⁶

na de la yañ log par rtoḡ pa yod pa de’i phyir re žig de ñid mām par gžag go žes bśad pa yin te | The initial treatment of inference is then expressly justified through Devendrabuddhi’s key phrase from the beginning of the second chapter.

¹⁵ PVṬ D Ñe 71a3: *mu stegs kyi dgra ’chos śiñ mi šes pa las skyob pa’i phyir nes pa’i tshig gi tshul gyis {gyis Q: gyi D} bstan bcos so* |

¹⁶ Cf. *Vyākhyāyukti*, Tibetan Text edited by Jong Cheol Lee, Tōkyō 2001, p. 277, l. 10–18: ... *sañs rgyas kyi gsuñ bstan bcos kyi mtshan ñid du ’had pa’i phyir ro || nes pa’i tshig du ’chos pa dañ | skyob par byed pas | de’i phyir bstan bcos so || ñoñ moñs dgra nams ma lus ’chos pa dañ || ñan ’gro srid las skyob pa gañ yin de || ’chos skyob von tan phyir na bstan bcos te || gñis po ’di dag gžan gyi lugs la med || de lta bas na sañs rgyas kyi gsuñ kho na don dam par bstan bcos yin pas ’chos pa dañ || skyob pa’i yon tan gyi phyir yañ don bzun ba la ’bad pa dañ ldan par bya’o* | The verse is also cited in Shīramatī’s *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣyañikā* (ed. Susumu Yamaguchi, Nagoya 1934, vol. I, p. 3, l. 9–12, and in Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapadā* (ed. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, St. Petersburg 1913, p. 3, l. 3f. On the basis of all these materials, the Sanskrit of the verse can be reconstructed as follows: *yac chāsti ca kleśaripūn aśeṣān santrāyate durgatito bhavāc ca | tac chāsanāt trānaguṇāc ca śāstram etad dvayaṃ cānyatameṣu nāsti* || In the *Vyākhyāyukti*, these two properties of a *śāstra* are unique to Buddhist treatises and thus make them superior to all others.

But in Śākyabuddhi’s case, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* conquers non-Buddhists as adversaries and protects beings from ignorance, functions which it arguably fulfils precisely because it provides correct definitions of means of valid cognition. The term *vyākhyā*, “explanation”, in Devendrabuddhi’s same compound, is also interpreted on a dialectical background: Dharmakīrti explains the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* through refuting false interpretations of it on the part of earlier commentators, or an earlier commentator (*pūrvāñikākāra*), and divergent opinions held by non-Buddhists (*tīrthikavimati*).¹⁷ The *Pramāṇavārttika* therefore offers explanations that serve to defend teachings articulated by Dignāga by refuting misunderstandings and ill-founded criticism.

The second question, why Dharmakīrti sets aside the chapter sequence of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, is answered with an alternative analysis of Devendrabuddhi’s key phrase *ācāryāyapramāṇalakṣaṇāśāstravyākhyānibandhanānumānam vyavasthāpya*, now held to account for the relationship between the first two chapters: Dharmakīrti first explained (*vyavasthāpya*) Dignāga’s chapter on inference for oneself (*ācāryāya ... anumānam*) because inference is a precondition (*nibandhana*) for Dharmakīrti’s own explanation (*vyākhyā*) of the Buddha’s words (*śāstra*) which are means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and provide definitions (*lakṣaṇa*) of such fundamental Buddhist concepts as the five psycho-physical constituents of living beings (*skandha*), the six sense-bases (*āyatana*), or the eighteen elements (*dhātu*). For it is on the basis of inference that Dharmakīrti will explain, in the *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter, that the Buddha’s words are correct whereas those of non-Buddhist teachers are not.¹⁸

On the whole, inference is therefore dealt with first not only because there are false opinions about it, but also because it serves as the paramount tool in an enterprise that is dialectical and interpretative in spirit: philosophical principles and soteriological claims that had been formulated by venerable teach-

¹⁷ PVKP 517,5f.: *pūrvāñikākārāsadvyākhyāñ tīrthikavimatiñ cāpanīya yathāsthītavyākhyāñam vyākhyā. tasyā nibandhanam anumānam*. This is a fragment of PVṬ Ñe D 71a5 = Q 86a1f.: *de’i śnar gyi fi kā byed pa’i mām par bśad pa ñan pa dañ | mu stegs byed kyi rtsod ñan bsal naṣ khyad par du bśad pa ni mām par bśad pa’o || de’i rgyu ni rjes su dpag pa’o* | The text of PVKP in Steinkellner 1981 reads *yathāvyavasthita*^o instead of *yathāsthita*^o, which must be a misprint.

¹⁸ PVṬ Ñe D 71b1f. = Q 86a6f.: *bstan bcos gañ gis phuñ po dañ khamś dañ | skye mched mtshon par byed pa de ni mtshan ñid kyi bstan bcos so || mi slu ba ñid kyi phyir tshad ma yañ de yin la | mtshan ñid kyi bstan bcos yañ yin pas na | tshad ma’i mtshan ñid kyi bstan bcos te | sañs rgyas kyi bka’ žes bya ba’i don to* | PVKP 517,29–518,2: *lakṣyante skandhadhārvāyatanāni yena śāstreṇa tal lakṣaṇāśāstram tripiṭakam. pramāṇam ca tad, avisamvāditvāt, lakṣaṇāśāstram ceti pramāṇalakṣaṇāśāstram bhagavatpravacanam ... iti bhāvah*. The reference to the *tripiṭaka* is absent from the Tibetan text of the PVṬ.

ers, yet were poorly understood and unfairly attacked by non-Buddhist opponents, are defended on its basis. Śākyabuddhi's focus is thus on outward functions of inference that require intellectual engagement with false views, if not personal contact with those who hold them. Arguably, such engagement will involve a temporary suspension of core Buddhist teachings simply because they are not part of the shared knowledge that can be relied upon by partners in a debate. It is accordingly perhaps a general focus on dialectical affairs on the part of Śākyabuddhi that can be held responsible for his interpretation of the claim that the Buddha is a means of valid cognition, which is one of the two components of the attribute *pramāṇabhūta* that occurs in Dignāga's salutation verse. For Śākyabuddhi, the predicate "... is a means of valid cognition" is to be taken metaphorically: the Buddha is *like* a means of valid cognition because, just as perception and inference, he is reliable (*avisamvādin*) with regard to human goals and illuminates previously unknown states of affairs (*ajñātārīhaprakāśa*). One might say that the Buddha literally has the nature of a means of valid cognition because he is stainless, non-conceptual and has unerring wisdom that has been accomplished through meditational practice. Still, he is not commonly known as such. The predication is therefore interpreted metaphorically in deference to the general level of knowledge prevalent among a wider audience that included non-Buddhists.¹⁹

4 Karṇakagomin's account of why Dharmakīrti explains inference

Aspects of Śākyabuddhi's treatment were taken up and rejected by Karṇakagomin, author of an 8th century commentary called *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṅkā*, of which only the chapter on inference for oneself is preserved. In its beginning, Karṇakagomin enumerates and rejects several interpretations of Dharmakīrti's statement of purpose which, to recall, runs as follows: "Because discerning what is beneficial and what is harmful is based on inference, he says, in order to establish this [inference] because there are false opinions about it ...". Karṇakagomin emphasises that in all rejected interpretations, including the one by Śākyabuddhi, the alleged function of inference for discerning what is harmful and what is beneficial is not exclusive to it, but can under certain conditions also be performed by perception. From this we can gather that for Karṇakagomin, Dharmakīrti's statement of pur-

pose must refer to a unique quality of inference that distinguishes it from other means of valid cognition.

This unique quality is found in inference's function on the path to liberation. Karṇakagomin construes the terms "beneficial" and "harmful" as referring to the four noble truths. Suffering and its arising are "harmful" because they are to be abandoned by those who strive for liberation. Cessation of suffering and the path that leads to its cessation are on the other hand beneficial because they are to be attained. For unliberated beings, discerning these matters requires inference, for their perception cannot possibly grasp them. If the four noble truths have been ascertained through inference, and are subsequently contemplated in meditative practice for an extended period of time, a stage may be reached where they can be directly and immediately seen in what becomes a Buddha's perceptual awareness.²⁰ At this stage, drawing upon inference is no longer necessary. Dharmakīrti does therefore not, as Śākyabuddhi claims, establish inference first because he will use it to defend Dignāga's definitions and the Buddha's teachings later in the text; rather, he establishes inference because inference is the only way in which a Buddhist can know the four noble truths in the early stages of the path. The exposition of inference is not motivated through its outward function, as a tool in a dialectical process, but rather through its inward function within Buddhism – through its capacity to provide ordinary beings with a correct understanding of fundamental soteriological truth. Even though Karṇakagomin does not address the chapter sequence itself – for he comments only on the chapter on inference for oneself –, but merely the motivation behind the chapter on inference for oneself, it is nevertheless telling that he seeks this motivation in a completely different domain than where Śākyabuddhi looks for the relative importance of inference.

²⁰ Cf. PVSVT 7,22–29, ms. 3b7–4a1: *kathaṃ tarhy arthānarthavivecanasyānumānāśra*<yatvam uktam?... >*ta naivātrārthā*<?tma>*nā*<bhīpretam, api tu caturāryasatyam.> *yato muktyarthino vayaṃ muktis* {*muktis* ms.: *muktis ca PVSVT*, a marginal correction below the line?} *caturāryasatyadarśanād bhavati bhagavaioktam. taddarśanam ca bhāvanābhīyāsato niṣpadyate. bhāvanāyāṃ pravṛttis ca caturāryasatyaniścayena. taniścayaś ca paroḅṣatvāt, anumānād eva bhavati arthānarthavivecanāśrayatvam anumānasyaiva. artho nirodhamārgav, upādeyatvād, anarthaḥ duḥkhasamudayau, tyājyatvāt. yad vā 'rthaḥ paramārthasatyam anarthaḥ <saṃvṛttisatyam tayor yad vivecanam> svarūpeṇa vyavasthāpanam tasyānumānāśrayatvāt.* Where text is added in pointed brackets, the last line of folio 3b and the first of 4a have been torn. Word-material inside pointed brackets has been suggested by way of emendation by the editor Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana.

Note that, as an afterthought, Karṇakagomin adds that one may also interpret "what is beneficial" as referring to ultimate reality and "what is harmful" to conventional reality.

¹⁹ Cf. PVT Ñe D71b5–72a2 = Q86b4–87a2, translated into English and discussed in Krasser 2001: 178ff.

5 Jayanta's justification of the new chapter sequence

The new chapter sequence with the *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter in the beginning is first attested in the commentary of Prajñākaragupta,²¹ where, however, it is not explicitly discussed. Jayanta, author of a commentary on it, was confronted with this new sequence and justifies it in the beginning of his commentary.²² The text, preserved only in Tibetan translation, is ambiguous to such an extent that my translation should be taken as a hypothesis rather than a definite conclusion. But while uncertainties remain concerning what the author says, it becomes, I think, sufficiently clear what he does, at least sufficiently clear to reveal how his general attitude towards the chapter sequence differs from that of Śākyabuddhi.

The section in question comprises two parts. The first is not directly concerned with the chapter sequence, but argues against the view that Dharmakīrti composed the *Pramāṇavārttika* with the purpose of explaining Dignāga's text, attributed to unnamed opponents who, moreover, are reported to believe that Dharmakīrti was motivated by compassion with those who despised Dignāga and, because of moral defects, were caught up in error.²³ In

²¹ The main indicator for this is the presence of a salutation verse in the beginning of the *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter, cf. Ono 1997: 707. This rules out that Prajñākaragupta knew the text in the original sequence and simply skipped commenting upon the chapter on inference for oneself. The introductory statement to the chapter on inference for others in PVA 467,4 further suggests that Prajñākaragupta knew the *Pramāṇavārttika* in the new sequence, where the chapter on inference for oneself immediately precedes the one on inference for others: "inference for others is dealt with immediately after inference for oneself because inference for others presupposes inference for oneself" (*svārthānumānāntaram parārthānumānam ucyate, svārthānumānapūrvakatvāt parārthānumānasya*). Immediately afterwards, Prajñākaragupta incorporates *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 3.1ab into his text. Ono 1997: 708 considers it possible that Prajñākaragupta might therefore on the whole address the sequence of Dignāga's text, and not of Dharmakīrti's. I consider it more likely that the incorporation of PS 3.1ab marks the actual beginning of the treatment of inference for others, subsequent to the introductory remarks concerned with the sequence in the *Pramāṇavārttika*.

²² Some of the features of Jayanta's exposition have been traced to Prajñākaragupta's text in Ono 1997. The second commentator on PVA, Yamāri, also provides a highly interesting discussion of the chapter sequence, yet here the Tibetan text is so problematic as to render an understanding (at present) impossible.

²³ PVAṬ D2a3ff. = Q2b4ff.: *de la sdug bshāl gyi rgyur gyur pa'i log pa'i śes pa can la yañ dag pa'i {pa'i D: par Q} śes pa bstan pa dan 'dra bar slob dpon la brñas pa'i kha na ma tho bas 'khrul pa'i skye bo yoñs su bskyañ bar 'dod pa'i thugs rjes de'i gzuñ gi {gi em.: gis DQ} bśad par gyur pa tshad ma rnam 'grel mdzad pa yin no źes zer ba ...* "In this [context], the [following view is maintained by others]: "There are beings who despise the teacher [Dignāga] and, because of their moral defects, are caught up in error.

refuting this position, Jayanta, among other things, argues that those provided with (correct) understanding do not rely on established views as explained by Dignāga as a matter of course; rather, they rely on these only insofar as this is required for gaining knowledge about the means for attaining liberation. Means of valid cognition are in this context means which provide knowledge about the means to attain liberation. Such means are what is to be established for the purpose of refuting ill-founded criticism and teaching correct proofs.²⁴

The second part of this section is an expanded commentary on Prajñākaragupta's own salutation verse, whose first half is literally taken over from Dignāga's salutation verse placed at the beginning of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*: *pramāṇabhūṭāya jagaddhitaiṣiṇe praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine ...* In the following text, bold print indicates quotations, which are taken either from Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikāṅkāra* or from the *Pramāṇavārttika*.

1) *yañ dag par rdzogs pa'i sañs rgyas bcom ldan 'das chos dan chos ma yin pa ston par mdzad pa rnam par dpyad par bya ba ma yin pa sgrub par byed pa yin la de ñid ni thams cad kyis ltos²⁵ par bya ba yin pa'i phyir de la ltos pa med par sgrub par byed pa yañ rigs pa ma yin no |*

2) *| bcom ldan 'das de yañ yañ dag pa'i tha sñad la ltos²⁶ nas rgyu dan 'bras bu'i gnas skabs kyi dbye bas rnam pa gñis te | rgyu'i gnas skabs ni byañ chub sems dpa'i gnas skabs te | de'i dus su yañ thams cad rjes su dpag pas rtogs par byed pa'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis rjes su dpag pa thog mar gsuñs so || luñ rigs dag gis²⁷ rnam dpyod pa*

Like [Dignāga composed his] explanation of correct cognition [directed] at those whose cognition is wrong, [a state which] causes [them] to suffer, [Dharmakīrti also] composed the *Pramāṇavārttika*, which explains the treatise of that [teacher Dignāga], out of compassion [with these beings], intending to afford [them] protection."²⁴

²⁴ This is an extrapolation of PVAṬ D2b5ff. = Q3a5ff.: *rtog pa dan ldan pa ni | des bstan pa'i gzuñ lugs la | ltos {ltos D: bltos Q} pa med pa yin te | byañ grol la sogs pa don du gñer ba la de'i thabs rig pa ni | phyin ci ma {ma om. Q.} log pa'i tshad mas rtogs par 'dod pa yin no || de yañ rjes su bzun bas | de la ltos pa dan bcas pa yañ yin te | 'khrul pa'i skye bos rab tu sbyar ba sun 'byin pa ltar sñañ ba bsal {bsal em.: gsal DQ} ba'i phyir dan | ji lta ba bñin gyi sgrub pa ñe bar bstan pa'i phyir de sgrub par rigs so |*

"One who is provided with understanding does not depend on established views (**mata/samaya*) explained by him (i.e. Dignāga). When he strives for goals like liberation and so forth, knowing the means for them is assumed as understanding by means of undistorted means of valid cognition [and nothing else is]; furthermore (*yañ*), he depends on these [established views] insofar as he is supported by these [means]. Establishing such [means, and no others] is appropriate in order to refute flawed criticism of [correct] proofs [that is undertaken] by erring persons, and in order to teach correct proofs."

²⁵ *ltos D: bltos Q*

²⁶ *ltos D: bltos Q*

²⁷ *gis D: gi Q*

|| [yuktyāgamābhyām vimṛśan]²⁸ zes rjes su dpag pa'i le'ur gañ 'chad par gyur pa bstan pa ni | 'gro la phan bzed ston pa [jagaddhitaṣṇe ... śāstre] zes bya <ba Q> 'o |

| de bzin du 'bras bu'i gnas skabs ni rañ gi don dan gzan gyi don dag phul du byuñ ba'i dbye bas rnam pa gñis so || de la rañ gi don phul du byuñ ba ni thams cad kyi rnam pa thams cad phyin ci ma log par mñon du mdzad pa'i phyir mñon sum gyi rañ bzin no || rnam pa du ma'i thabs mañ po [bahuśo bahudhopāyaṃ]²⁹ zes gañ 'chad par 'gyur ba bstan pa ni | bde gsegs skyob pa [sugatāya tāyine] zes bya'o || gzan gyi don phul du byuñ ba yañ bcom ldan 'das ni de ji lta ba bzin du mñon par 'dod pa'i lam gzan rnam la ston par mdzad pa'i phyir gzan gyi don gyi rjes su dpag pa'i rañ bzin no |

| de la rañ gi don phul du byuñ ba rtsa ba yin pa'i phyir thog mar mñon sum mo || de'i dbaṅ du gyur pa'i rjes su dpag pa yañ tshad ma yin pas bsgrub bya ji lta bas khyab pa'i rtags³⁰ dran par byed pa ñid kho nas tshig gi tha sñad la ñe bar sbyor ba'i phyir rañ gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa'i 'og tu gzan gyi don gyi rjes su dpag pa bsgrub par 'dod nas de bstan pa ni skyob la [tāyin] zes bya ba'o | ...

3) tshad ma gsum po 'di'i yañ spyi'i mtshan ñid med na | rig byed la sogs pa tshad ma ma yin pa mtshan ñid dan bral ba can mi rtogs pa'i phyir tshad ma spyi'i mtshan ñid rab tu sgrub pa'i phyir le'u dan pos te de bstan pa ni tshad mar gyur pa [pramāṇabhūta] zes bya ba'o |

4) | gzan yañ bcom ldan 'das kun rdzob dan don dam pa'i no bo gzan gyi 'khrul pa sel ba 'dir bsgrub par bya ste | bag chags dan bcas pa'i dri ma thams cad rab tu spans pa'i phyir yon tan phun sum tshogs pa brñes pas phul du byuñ ba dños po ma lus pa gñis su med par thugs su chud pa'i phyir mñon sum pa'i bdag ñid can ni don dam par ro || kun rdzob tu yañ de dan rjes su mthun pa ñid kyi tshad ma yin par šes pa'i don du de la 'khrul pa med pa'i mnam par rtog pa dan tshig gi no bo rañ gi don dan gzan gyi don gyi rjes su dpag pa'i dbye bas bstan te | ... lhag ma ni 'di la yañ mtshuñs so zes bya ba ni le'u'i go rims so |

1) The Buddha, the Venerable One, fully awakened (**samyaksambuddha*), who shows what is the Buddhist teaching (*dharma*) and what is not [and is] beyond scrutiny, is a means for establishing [something] (**sādhaka/sādhana*); because everything is actually dependent on him, establishing [something] independently of him is utterly impossible.

2) Moreover, based on right behaviour/language use (*yañ dag pa'i tha sñad*) (?), the Venerable [Buddha] is twofold according to the distinction between state of cause and state of effect. The state of cause is the state of the Bodhisattva, and (*yañ*) because the venerable [Buddha] at this point in time understands everything through inference, he states inferences at first. In order to point out what he will later explain in the inference chapter [namely Dharmakīrti's statement in the *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter that begins with the words] “reflecting with [the help of] argumentation

²⁸ *PV pramāṇasiddhi* 132cd: *yuktyāgamābhyām vimṛśan duḥkhaḥeturṃ parīkṣate*, “reflecting with [the help of] argumentation and scripture, he investigates the cause of suffering”.

²⁹ *PV pramāṇasiddhi* 136: *bahuśo bahudhopāyaṃ kālena bahunā śya ca | gacchanty abhyasyatas tatra guṇadoṣāḥ prakāśatām ||*

³⁰ rtags D: don Q

and scripture”³¹ [Prajñākaragupta says] “who seeks the benefit of the world” [and] “teacher” [in the salutation verse].

Regarding the state of effect [the Buddha] is equally twofold, [namely] according to the distinction between the attainment of one's own objectives and that of the objectives of others. Of these, regarding the attainment of one's own objectives, [he] has the nature of perception because [he] is directly and unmistakably aware of all aspects [of reality] in every respect. In order to point out what [later] will be explained [namely the words] “[For him who practices] many means in many ways”³² [Prajñākaragupta says] “well-gone” [and] “protector” [in the salutation verse]. [Regarding] the attainment of the objectives of others, on the other hand, [the Buddha] has the nature of inference for others because the Venerable [Buddha] teaches the path to others as he himself intends it [to be].

Of these [three forms of valid cognition] perception is [explained] first because it is the basis for the attainment of one's own objectives. Because, moreover, inference, [occurring] by force of (*dbaṅ du gyur pa*) this [perception], is [also] a means of valid cognition, it is applied in language use which [proceeds] only through drawing upon a logical reason that is pervaded by what is to be proven [i.e. in inference for others]. Intending to show that [Dharmakīrti] for this purpose [deals with] inference for others [immediately] after inference for oneself, [Prajñākaragupta] says, in order to explain this, “protector”.

3) Without a general definition of these three means of valid cognition it is not understood that the Vedas etc. are not means of valid cognition, [i.e.] that they lack the defining characteristics [of means of valid cognition]. Because it consequently establishes the general definition of means of valid cognition, [this] is the first chapter; to explain this, [Prajñākaragupta] says [in his salutation verse] “who, as well as having come into existence, is a means of valid cognition” etc.

4) Moreover, the venerable [Buddha] is to be established here [as] being of conventional and ultimate nature, removing the errors of others. Because he has completely removed the impurities together with [their] latent impressions and has thereby attained complete realisation of virtues, he thoroughly realises the ultimate, [i.e.] the whole reality (**samastavastu*), in a non-dual fashion.³³ That he has the nature of perception is therefore [what is true] ultimately. Conventionally, [he] is also a means of valid cognition, [a fact] which is in conformity with this [i.e. that he has the na-

³¹ In other words, somewhere in the chapter on inference for others, Prajñākaragupta will explain what Dharmakīrti says in *PV pramāṇasiddhi* 132cd, and this is in the salutation verse indicated with the words *jagaddhitaṣṇe* and *śāstre*.

³² *PV pramāṇasiddhi* 136: *bahuśo bahudhopāyaṃ kālena bahunā śya ca | ... abhyasyatas* The translation follows the Sanskrit. The first half of the verse in *PV* reads in Tibetan: | *rnam pa du mar thabs mañ po || yun riñ sus su goms pa las* | While the Sanskrit text speaks of the contemplation of means intensively (*bahuśaḥ*) and in various ways (*bahudhā*), the Tibetan translation speaks of the contemplation of various means in various ways.

³³ Ono 1997: 712 translates the main clause as “... perceives the highest entire non-duality” and omits *dños po*.

ture of perception in an ultimate sense].³⁴ To make this understood [Dharmakīrti] offers an explanation according to the distinction between inference for oneself and [inference] for others which [respectively] have the nature of conceptualisation and words [both of] which do not deviate from this [perception of the Buddha]. ... The rest is the same [as above]. Such is the [chapter] sequence.

Praising the Buddha with various attributes, Jayanta first declares him to be a means for establishing something, i.e. a means of valid cognition, and that no act of establishment can be carried out independently of him. In textual terms, this is a commentary on the expression *pramāṇa* (*bhūta*) in Prajñākaragupta's salutation verse.

The three following paragraphs are preoccupied mainly with explicating this initial proposition. Jayanta also explains why the remaining three chapters are arranged in the sequence perception – inference for oneself – inference for others. Paragraph no. 3 additionally justifies the initial position of the *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter through the general definition of means of valid cognition that is given in its beginning: without this definition, it is not possible to understand that the Vedas or other dubious sources of knowledge assumed by non-Buddhists are not means of valid cognition. However, this argumentation recedes into the background in view of the pervasive concern with the Buddha that dominates the section.

In two different ways, paragraphs no. 2 and 4 show how the Buddha can be identified with the three individual forms of valid cognition, that is, with perception, inference for oneself and inference for others that represent the main topics of the three subsequent chapters. In paragraph no. 2, the Buddha is viewed alternately with reference to a "state of cause" (**hetvavasthā*) and a "state of effect" (**phalāvasthā*). A Buddha in the state of cause is a Bodhisattva. Because a Bodhisattva understands everything through inference, the Buddha in this state investigates the cause of suffering by reflecting (on them) with the help of argumentation and scripture; in this sense, one could supply, he "is" inference for oneself.

The Buddha in the state of effect can again be viewed under two different aspects, as attaining his own objectives and as attaining those of others. In the former sense, the Buddha has the nature of perception, because he is directly and truthfully aware of everything in every respect. From the viewpoint of the objectives of other beings, the Buddha has the nature of inference for oth-

³⁴ Ono 1997: 712 translates, omitting the abstract suffix *ñid*: "Also in view of the conventional [truth], [cognition] is valid, which is consistent with the [direct perception by the Lord]." However, the validity of cognition in general is not at issue here; rather, the text is concerned with the Buddha having the nature of the individual forms of valid cognition and here – most probably – emphasises that what is conventionally the case is in conformity with what is ultimately the case.

ers because he teaches the Buddhist path. Having thus justified why the *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter comes first in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, Jayanta next addresses the sequence of the remaining three chapters. Perception comes first because of its cardinal role for the attainment of one's own objectives. Inference for oneself depends on perception and thus is treated in the next chapter; inference for others in turn depends on inference for oneself and is consequently placed at the end.

Paragraph no. 4 considers the Buddha from the viewpoint of ultimate and conventional truth. Because the morally purified Buddha is thoroughly aware of the whole of reality in a non-dual fashion, without succumbing to the superimposition of an object-subject-duality on consciousness that ordinary beings invariably perform, he has the nature of perception in an ultimate sense. In a conventional sense, the Buddha is identified with the two forms of inference, though the text here does not detail how this is to be understood. After a few intermediate remarks which need not concern us here, Jayanta ends the section by stating that "the rest is the same", i.e. the sequence of chapters two to four of the *Pramāṇavārttika* as justified in paragraph no. 2 also holds good from the viewpoint of the explanation proposed in paragraph no. 4.

The initial position of the *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter is justified predominantly through its dealing with the Buddha. In two different ways, the Buddha is identified with each of the three forms of cognition dealt with in the remaining chapters, insofar as the mind of a Buddha cognises reality correctly through them, exclusively or predominantly, either at a certain stage in his path or in a certain "sense", i.e. ultimately and conventionally. If the Buddha "is" each individual form, his mind actually encompasses all forms of valid cognition that are of importance to the logico-epistemological tradition – which, for Jayanta, are only those that are relevant to the attainment of liberation. It is in this sense, arguably, that establishing something by means of valid cognition depends on the Buddha, for his mind encompasses all forms of knowledge required for liberation. To emphasise, the Buddha is here not appealed to as an authority who proclaims religious truth, but as an exemplary mind whose liberation involved reliance on the very means of valid cognition that the logico-epistemological tradition of Buddhism elucidates. Within his account of means of valid cognition in general as soteriologically relevant, Jayanta, like Kaṛṇakagomin, highlights the inward function of inference as a tool for understanding soteriological doctrines. It is thus hardly surprising that Jayanta, like Prajñākaragupta,³⁵ takes the claim "the Buddha is a means of valid cognition" literally: the word "Buddha" refers to an awakened mind who in fact *is* a means of valid cognition, and not, as Śākyabuddhi

³⁵ For Prajñākaragupta, see PVA_o 84,1f., discussed in Krasser 2001: 181, n. 31.

would argue in front of a broader audience comprising non-Buddhists as well, to a personality who is *like* a means of valid cognition.

6 Conclusions

In spite of their text-centered nature, the above positions of altogether three representatives of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition show a diversity of perspectives regarding the predominant role of inference, in whose exposition quite different backgrounds become involved. Śākyabuddhi depicts inference primarily as a tool in a dialectical and interpretative enterprise directed at philosophical and soteriological teachings alike. While we have no documentary evidence regarding Śākyabuddhi's social environment and the situation of the Buddhist order therein, it seems still safe to view this focus as the result of an environment where Buddhist scholars engage their non-Buddhist opponents in writing and debate. In this sense, Śākyabuddhi emphasises the outward function of inference that brings Buddhists in contact with representatives of other traditions. Karṇakagomin, on the other hand, presents inference as the sole instrument for ordinary beings to understand fundamental soteriological truth, and accordingly highlights its inward function within the Buddhist tradition itself. Naturally, this does not entail that Śākyabuddhi would not have recommended Buddhist adepts to understand the four noble truths through inference, or that Karṇakagomin would not have engaged in debate with Brahmins, for these are statements of relative priority regarding the function of inference rather than statements of principle which express its sole task. Finally, in Jayanta's justification of the new chapter sequence with the *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter in initial position, soteriological goals permeate and limit all occupation with logic and epistemology. Here, too, the inward function of inference is considered its most important one: inference for oneself serves to understand, and inference for others serves to teach and explain.

How can these viewpoints, these perhaps "strategical" positionings of different thinkers in their respective environments about which we know so little, be related to the question as to whether or not Buddhists consider argumentation as relevant for liberation only in a preliminary, or limited sense? Soteriological relevance of forms of knowledge can be seen from two perspectives: a certain form of knowledge can be said to help an adept on the Buddhist path to attain liberation or it can be assumed to assist in the overall justification of soteriological goals or practical methods. Inference can potentially be relevant in both senses, and its relevance may equally be limited in both senses: at a certain stage in the Buddhist path, inference is no longer re-

quired for the Yogin whose mind is directly aware of the four noble truths, and the question remains how inference can justify suprasensible matters like the truth of suffering to begin with.

In Śākyabuddhi's discussion of the chapter sequence, soteriological relevance surfaces only by virtue of its general, justificational function: inference serves as a tool to defend the Buddha's soteriological teachings, in addition to defending Dignāga's philosophical ones. Because Śākyabuddhi aims to explain why Dharmakīrti, unlike Dignāga, places inference at the very beginning of his text, his account merely emphasises that inference is relevant in this respect and stops short of discussing possible further limitations. Furthermore, because of its emphasis on defense, this account has no room for the possibility that one may discover truths through argumentation which run against what has been taught by the venerable masters. It would be an act of over-interpretation to conclude from such limited inquiries as the above that Śākyabuddhi, or this tradition in general, had no regard for open-ended-inquiry at all and placed inference merely at the service of justifying dogma, but the relationship between inference and the ends it is meant to serve remains an interesting object for further reflection.

In contrast to Śākyabuddhi, Karṇakagomin's view of inference as the sole method by which ordinary beings can understand the four noble truths concerns its practical relevance for attaining liberation, while spiritually advanced beings who have thoroughly contemplated them in meditative practice realise them through immediate awareness. Insofar as the latter group no longer needs inference, inference is thus of limited soteriological relevance, but still of vital importance. Finally, in an interesting fashion, Jayanta's reorientation of epistemology at large towards matters relevant for liberation has not much room for a limitation of relevance. Rather than limiting the soteriological relevance of means of valid cognition, he seems to limit means of valid cognition to that which is soteriologically relevant in a practical respect.

7 Bibliography and Abbreviations

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| Krasser 2001 | Helmut Krasser: On Dharmakīrti's Understanding of <i>pramāṇabhūta</i> and His Definition of <i>pramāṇa</i> . <i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasien</i> 45, 173–199. |

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- Steinkellner 1981 Ernst Steinkellner: Philological remarks on Śākyamati's *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*. Bruhn, Klaus & Albrecht Wezler (eds): *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus. Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 283–295.
- D em. Derge recension of the bsTan 'gyur. emended; “*gi* em.: *gis* DQ” means that the emendation *gi* is proposed against the reading *gis* which is attested in Derge and Peking.
- om. omitted; “*gi* om. Q” means that *gi* has been omitted in Peking.
- PS *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga). The Sanskrit text of the salutation verse is cited on the basis of fragments given in Hattori 1968.
- PV *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti). Passages from the *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter are cited according to Tilmann Vetter: *Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde* 12. Wien 1984.
- PVA *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (Prajñākaragupta). *Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta*. Deciphered and edited by Tripiṭakāchārya Rāhula Sāṅkrītyāyana. Patna 1953: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.
- PVA_o Motoi Ono: *Prajñākaraguptas Erklärung der Definition gültiger Erkenntnis (Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra zu Pramāṇavārttika II 1–7)*. Wien 2000: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- PVKP *Pramāṇavārttikakroḍapattra*. Printed as Appendix to Manorathanandin's *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*, ed. Sāṅkrītyāyana, Appendix to the *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* XXIV 1937.
- PVP *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi). Commentary on chapters two to four of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. D 4217 Che 1b1–326b4, Q 5717 Che 1b1–390a8.

- PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti), chapter on inference for oneself of the *Pramāṇavārttika* together with the author's auto-commentary. Ed. by Raniero Gnoli, Roma 1967.
- PVSVṬ *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* (Kaṇḍakagomin). Ed. by Rāhula Sāṅkrītyāyana, Allahabad 1943.
- PVṬ *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (Śākyabuddhi), commentary on the chapter on inference for oneself of *Pramāṇavārttika* and on Dharmakīrti's auto-commentary, and on the chapters two to four of Devendrabuddhi's PVP. D 4220 Je 1b1–Ñe 282a7., Q 5718 Je 1b1–Ñe 348a8.
- PVAT *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā* (Jayanta), commentary on Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*. D 4222 De 1b1–365a7, Q5720, De1b1–375a2.
- Q Peking recension of the bsTan 'gyur.

Hōrin

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11

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Introduction

The term "Buddhism" refers to a large number of rather different doctrines, schools, concepts, traditions, philosophies, religions, and even life styles. Perhaps the only characteristics these teachings and developments have in common, is some *reference* to or *connection* with the historical Buddha, the Four Truths, and the aim to end suffering. Moreover, in the 21st century, most people think of Zen or Tibetan Buddhism when hearing or reading words like "Buddhism". They certainly do not think of such Buddhist disciplines as the Buddhist scholastic theories and applications of logic. Even some scholars who are professionally engaged in Buddhist studies, do not pay much attention to these scholastic theories. However, if one wants to present a fair picture of Buddhism or parts of it, one should try to avoid such vagueness and oneness. This is precisely one of the reasons why this volume focuses on the role that logic plays in Buddhism, *and* why it attempts to do so *in a way which is relevant to every kind of Buddhism*. This becomes clear from the principal questions of the contributions:

- (1) Which theories and notions of logic have been developed or applied in Buddhism?
- (2) Which Buddhist traditions, schools and doctrines developed or applied so-called classic (two-valued) concepts of logical form?
- (3) Which role, if any, did such concepts play in formulating theories about ending suffering, i.e., realizing *nirvāna*?

The first and second question help clarifying the problem of whether or not there are Buddhist theories of non-contradiction and valid conclusion that significantly differ from theories developed and applied in non-Buddhist traditions, schools, etc. In particular, they help dealing with the widespread hypothesis that there is a distinctively Buddhist logic, significantly different, e.g. from Aristotelian logic. The third question is of at least similar importance. Its answer leads to a critical analysis of the claim that (Buddhist) salvation, enlightenment, or realization of *nirvāna*, presupposes, in some significant sense, neglect or even violation, e.g., of the laws of identity, non-contradiction, and/or transitivity. *This question can be employed as a heuristic means for analyzing and interpreting every Buddhist teaching, theory or Buddhist "way."* The question thus also provides a criterium to categorize Buddhist teachings, schools, etc. To deal with this question may also help to discard attempts to mystify Buddhism – which of course must not be confused with acknowledging that mystics is mystics.